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The diffusion of innovations varies considerably from country 
to country. Some countries adopt a specific innovation ear-
lier, while other countries are late. For instance, the break-
through of the Internet started earlier and the diffusion is now 
more complete in the United States than in any other coun-
try. The same has been the case with cellular phones in 
Finland or the facsimile machine in Japan. An explanation 
that takes into consideration solely the properties of the in-
novation will not suffice to explain these differences. Sup-
porting factors in the respective countries must also be taken 
into account. Countries which not only adopt innovations 
early, but also shape world markets by the demand they 
create, can be described and analysed as lead markets.  
Lead markets are “geographic markets, which have the 
characteristic that product or process innovations, which are 
designed to fit local demand preferences and local (...) con-
ditions, can subsequently be introduced successfully in other 
geographic markets as well and commercialised world-wide 
without many modifications. In the model of international dif-
fusion of innovations, a lead market is the core of the world 
market where the local users are early adopters of an inno-
vation on an international scale” (Beise 1999: 4). This defini-
tion focuses on two characteristics of lead markets. Firstly, 
they are pioneering countries in the development and mar-
keting of innovations. Secondly, innovations that arise in 
these markets subsequently diffuse world-wide. Both phe-
nomena call for analysis and explanation.  
We expect in these mechanisms a considerable potential for 
an encompassing ecological modernisation. Ideally, lead 
markets affect competition in other market regions, trigger 
appropriate responses and adaptations, and thereby lead to 
the international diffusion of the new technology. We are par-
ticularly interested in policies which facilitate or are constitu-
tive to lead markets. We aim to analyse both the emergence 
of pioneer markets and the mechanism of international diffu-
sion of environmental innovations. 
At first glance, lead markets are often countries with the fol-
lowing features (Meyer-Krahmer 1999):  
• High per capita income 
• Demanding, innovative buyers and high quality standards 
• Problems creating pressure for change and innovation 
• Flexible regulation and innovation-friendly basic condi-
tions for producers and users 
• Product standards acknowledged in other countries 
It can be expected that these factors are characteristic of 
lead markets for environmental technologies as well, but that 
there are also additional factors at work here, arising from 
the particular context in which environmental innovations are 
developed, both at the national and international level. Envi-
ronmental innovations are not only stimulated by the higher 
environmental standards of consumers in a country as com-
pared with those in other countries, but also by special pro-
motional measures, or by political intervention in the market 
(Klemmer et al. 1999; Jänicke et al. 2000). Furthermore, en-
vironmental innovations provide marketable solutions to en-
vironmental problems that are usually encountered world-
wide, or at least in many countries. Thus, technological solu-
tions to environmental problems inherently lend themselves 
to adoption in international or global markets. 
Lead markets may fulfil a range of functions. From an inter-
national perspective, they provide marketable solutions to 
global environmental problems. Lead markets in high-
income countries are able to raise the necessary funds for 
the development of innovations. This may assist new tech-
nologies through their teething troubles. In demonstrating 
both technical and political feasibility, they stimulate other 
countries and enterprises to adopt their pioneering stan-
dards.  
From a national perspective, ambitious standards or support 
mechanisms may create a first-mover advantage for domes-
tic industries. Furthermore, ambitious policy measures can 
attract internationally mobile capital for the development and 
marketing of environmental innovations. Finally, economic 
advantages legitimate the national policymakers, and a de-
manding policy provides them with an attractive role in the 
global arena. 
On the other hand, the international diffusion of environ-
mental innovations is constrained by the national specifics of 
its origin. Environmental innovations are usually induced by 
national environmental regulations and subsidies and it is 
not immediately rational for firms in countries without the 
same regulation or governmental intervention to adopt them. 
Therefore, either the international diffusion of environmental 
innovations must be accompanied by international policy dif-
fusion, or the adoption by other countries of the induced in-
novations must be economically reasonable. This paper 
aims to identify policy patterns that stimulate internationally 
successful environmental innovations while avoiding nation-
ally idiosyncratic innovations.  
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The main subject of this paper is the international diffusion of 
environmental innovations, i.e. the emergence of lead mar-
kets out of pioneering markets for environmental innova-
tions. We want to determine which actors (governments, 
NGOs, economic actors) and their respective strategies 
have the potential to facilitate lead markets.  
Our analysis consists of three distinct steps. First, theories of 
innovation economics, environmental economics, manage-
ment sciences and policy sciences are reviewed with regard 
to their contribution to an explanation of lead markets. Sec-
ond, cases of lead markets as they are described in litera-
ture are reviewed and compared. The final step seeks to 
build on the first two to develop an analytical framework.  
2 Theoretical Approaches 
2.1 Lessons from innovation economics 
The main question the lead market theory must address is 
why countries follow a lead market in adopting an innovation, 
even if these markets have previously favoured different en-
vironmental innovation approaches or designs. An innova-
tion design is a technical specification of an innovation idea. 
An environmental problem can be solved by a variety of in-
novation designs. Different countries usually prefer different 
innovation designs for a given problem, as the initial market 
contexts pose different technical requirements. Not just 
strong needs and the demand for a particular innovation, but 
also the ability to transfer nationally specific innovations or 
preferences abroad is a condition for a lead market. A vari-
ety of lead effects are responsible for this internationalisation 
of an innovation design. The lead or leverage effect is the 
mechanism by which a design adopted by the lead market 
spreads to lag markets, supersedes initially preferred alter-
native designs in these markets, and becomes the globally 
dominant design. There are several factors that can explain 
this internationalisation pattern. Basically, lower prices and 
certainty of the benefit of an innovation design can compen-
sate for internationally varying market conditions. Secondly, 
an international trend that is most advanced in the lead mar-
ket brings about an internationalisation of needs (or prefer-
ences), and thus the adoption of innovations which respond 
to these needs by more and more countries. Beise (2001) 
has reviewed these and other explanations of the lead mar-
ket phenomenon. On the basis of these results, a system of 
five groups of lead advantages of a country has been de-
rived:  
1. Price advantage. National conditions that result either in 
relative price decreases of a nationally preferred innova-
tion design compared to designs preferred in other coun-
tries, or in the anticipation of international factor price 
changes. 
2. Demand advantage. National conditions that result in the 
anticipation of the benefits of an innovation design 
emerging at a global level. 
3. Transfer advantage. National conditions which increase 
the perceived benefit of a nationally preferred innovation 
design for users in other countries, or by which national 
demand conditions are actively transferred abroad. 
4. Export advantage. National conditions that support the 
inclusion of foreign demand preferences in nationally pre-
ferred innovation designs. 
5. Market structure advantage. National conditions that in-
crease the level of competition between domestic com-
panies and facilitate low market entry barriers for new 
ones. 
Demand advantage 
National demand advantage results from local conditions 
which facilitate the anticipation of the benefit of nationally 
preferred innovation designs in foreign markets. This 
mechanism allows the internationalisation of innovation de-
signs and is dependent on a global trend in which specific 
innovations become increasingly beneficial or preferable to 
most countries. This trend can be, for example, a demo-
graphic trend, an environmental trend, or simply an increase 
in per capita income. A trend can also mean a time lead in 
building up infrastructure complementary to the innovation. 
Lead markets are at the forefront of the international trend. 
Various factors can put users in a country at the forefront of 
a trend: high income, as in the case of Vernon’s (1966) prod-
uct life cycle; a national context that foreshadows global en-
vironmental changes; an advanced accumulation of collat-
eral assets, such as infrastructure. When other countries 
catch up, they demand the innovation already in use in the 
country at the forefront of the trend.  
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Price advantage 
Countries may gain a price advantage if the relative price of 
the nationally preferred innovation design decreases, so that 
differences in demand preference to foreign countries can be 
compensated. This price mechanism is the centrepiece of 
Levitt’s (1983) globalisation hypothesis, in which the con-
sumers in foreign markets “capitulate” to the attraction of 
lower prices and abandon their initial selection of goods. 
Price reductions are mainly due to cost reductions based on 
static and dynamic economies of scale. The two nation-
specific factors of economies of scale are market size and 
market growth. Another price advantage emerges from an-
ticipatory factor prices; the lead market demands innovations 
induced by factor price changes which later occur world-
wide. A factor that is more expensive in the lead market than 
in other countries, e.g. petrol, induces innovations causing 
the factor to be used less, e.g. more fuel-efficient cars. When 
the factor becomes expensive in other countries as well, the 
same innovations are adopted in these lag countries. In such 
a case, the lead-market country anticipates a world-wide 
price trend. The same price advantage results from price 
changes of goods complementary to the innovation design. 
Export advantage 
National conditions that support the inclusion of foreign de-
mand preferences in nationally preferred innovation designs 
constitute a national export advantage. One can derive three 
factors of a national export advantage: domestic demand 
that is sensitive to the problems and needs of foreign coun-
tries; long-time export experience of domestic companies; 
and the similarity of local market conditions to foreign market 
conditions. Firstly, even if a country is not at the forefront of 
a global trend in terms of domestic environmental issues, 
domestic users may be more sensitive to global problems 
and needs than potential adopters in countries where the 
problem is more advanced. This sensitivity of demand can 
provide incentives for domestic companies to adopt a global 
perspective and increase their ability to meet global prob-
lems ahead of companies in other countries. For instance, 
consumers in a given country may be sensitive to the effects 
of world-wide climatic change, even if their domestic envi-
ronment is not as seriously affected as that of other coun-
tries.  
Secondly, firms in a given country have an advantage over 
foreign competitors if their innovations can be exported more 
easily. Innovations can be exported more easily if (1) the en-
vironmental and market conditions of foreign countries are 
similar to the market for which the innovation was designed, 
and (2) a design includes features that make it suitable for a 
variety of contexts. The reduction in the variety of nation-
specific designs is faster, because it is easier for a country to 
turn to a foreign design if the loss of benefit is small. De-
kimpe et al. (1998) support the hypothesis already proposed 
by Vernon (1979) that the higher the similarity of cultural, so-
cial and economic factors between two countries, the greater 
the likelihood that an innovation design adopted by one of 
two countries will be adopted by the other country as well. 
Companies can gain an export advantage if knowledge of 
the benefit of innovations to users in foreign countries is ap-
plied in the design of their innovations. Knowledge of foreign 
market conditions enables an innovator to design his innova-
tions to fit the local as well as foreign markets by incorporat-
ing additional features. With such “dual-use” or “robust” in-
novation designs, a company can catch up with foreign firms’ 
innovations in their home markets at an early stage, so as to 
pre-empt the international competition for nation-specific 
technologies. A country’s context, including its users, suppli-
ers and national institutions, can support or pressure com-
panies to design innovations which can be exported. Small 
countries’ firms are often pressured into developing innova-
tions for both domestic and foreign environments, because 
the domestic market is too small to justify the necessary 
R&D investment.  
Transfer advantage 
When users in a given country adopt an innovation design, 
this can increase the perceived benefit of the design among 
users in further countries, thus influencing their adoption de-
cisions. The perceived benefit increases when information 
on the usability of the innovation design is made available. 
Information about the innovation not only raises awareness 
of the innovation design, but also reduces uncertainty sur-
rounding new products and processes. A country can have a 
transfer advantage if its market context supports increases in 
the perceived benefit of a nationally preferred innovation de-
sign for users in foreign countries. Diffusion theory suggests 
that the international diffusion of durable goods depends on 
the intensity of communication between two countries (Ta-
kada/Jain 1991). The lead market could therefore be the 
country that has the strongest communication ties with other 
countries. Lead countries are those that are generally 
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watched by many other countries, for instance countries that 
are intensively covered by mass media or whose lifestyles 
are often present in television series and motion pictures. In 
the international innovation diffusion context, the “demon-
stration effect” (Mansfield 1968) becomes an international 
“lead effect” (Kalish et al. 1995). Potential adopters in a sec-
ond country observe the success of the innovation in the first 
market earlier than the success of innovations adopted in 
other, not so keenly watched countries. The reputation and 
sophistication of a user can be a signal for the quality of an 
innovation design. As Porter (1990) pointed out early on, it is 
not only the quantity, but also the quality of the home de-
mand that determines the international competitive advan-
tage of a nation. Therefore, even a small country with a 
small market size can achieve a competitive advantage in 
certain segments. The quality of home demand can be inter-
preted as information on the specification of an innovation, 
based on the users’ competence, know-how and prior ex-
perience with related products or processes.  
International network externalities constitute a further trans-
fer advantage. The Internet has gained international appeal 
because it connects all countries in a standardised transmis-
sion protocol. The preference for a design can likewise be 
actively transferred abroad. A country transfers demand for 
innovation design abroad through multinational companies, 
using the innovation in their foreign subsidiaries.  
Market structure advantage 
Innovations may be adopted internationally simply because, 
among all alternatives, they are the most beneficial to the 
most countries. The reason users in one country adopt an 
innovation before users in other countries is sometimes that 
the market pushes local companies to innovate, making the 
innovation available earlier in that country. Faster develop-
ment and more market-oriented innovations can be sup-
ported by competition. From Posner (1961) to Dosi et al. 
(1990), the degree of competition and entrepreneurial effort 
in the domestic market has been described as one of the 
main determinants of international patterns of innovations. 
Even in the case of Japan, Sakakibara/Porter (2001) found 
that the higher the domestic competition, the bigger the 
country’s export success. Firstly, buyers tend to be more 
demanding when the producers face competition than when 
they are tightly regulated or hold a monopoly (Porter 1990). 
Secondly, competing companies are more strongly pres-
sured to follow those who have already adopted a new tech-
nology (Mansfield 1968: 144). Thirdly, and perhaps most im-
portantly, more innovation designs are tested in a competi-
tive market than in a monopolised market. As a result, a 
competitive market is more appropriate for finding a design 
that is not only the best within the domestic environment, but 
in all national environments. Fierce domestic competition fa-
cilitates the tapping of an internationally homogeneous latent 
consumer demand for innovations. 
2.2 Lessons from policy analysis  
The international diffusion of clean(er) technologies is fre-
quently supported by the diffusion of their supporting poli-
cies. Recent comparative research on the spread of envi-
ronmental policy among countries reveals a remarkable in-
ternational convergence in the development of national pol-
icy patterns (Kern 2000; Jörgens 1996; Jänicke/Weidner 
1997). Standard solutions from pioneer countries diffuse 
world-wide, thus bringing about a substantial convergence in 
policy formulation at the national level – irrespective of often 
considerably different capacities for action. Unlike in the 
1970s, when the USA or Japan had a major innovative func-
tion in global environmental policy, today innovations in envi-
ronmental policy emerge strikingly often in small EU coun-
tries that are tightly integrated in the global market (Jänicke 
1998).  
The – reformed – institutional fabric of the EU seems com-
paratively favourable both for innovations and for their diffu-
sion (Héritier et al. 1994). Firstly, the EU must accept, at 
least in principle, a “high level of protection” in member 
states. Secondly, it must seek to harmonise innovations in 
environmental policy implemented at the national level. Pio-
neer countries, for their part, often have an interest in an-
choring their policy innovations within the EU framework in 
order to minimise necessary subsequent adaptations to 
European policy. It is to their advantage to “Europeanise” na-
tional pioneering measures which favour the particular coun-
try’s domestic industry. Policy diffusion within the EU, how-
ever, takes place not only by way of EU harmonisation, but 
also from country to country. In the latter case, the policy in-
novation in question often must first be introduced by one of 
the more influential EU countries before achieving the nec-
essary widespread impact. The adoption of the CO2/energy 
tax by Germany’s red-green coalition government in 1998, 
after its introduction in the Netherlands and the Scandina-
vian countries in the early 1990s, is an example of “horizon-
tal” diffusion. It has yet to be established as a European 
measure. 
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The diffusion of innovations in environmental policy thus 
takes place both directly from one country to another, i.e. by 
way of imitative policy learning or “lesson drawing” (Rose 
1993) and by way of international institutions (e.g. interna-
tional regimes), organisations (OECD, UNEP, World Bank, 
Greenpeace), or expert networks (e.g. the International Net-
work of Green Planners). Environmental ministries have, in a 
period of less than 30 years, strongly asserted their position 
in more than 130 countries. Just ten years after the Rio Con-
ference (1992), environmental plans, as defined under 
“Agenda 21”, have been adopted almost world-wide – albeit 
in extremely disparate quality. In other cases (e.g. soil pro-
tection legislation), however, the diffusion rate is clearly 
curbed by the tenacity of the underlying problems. 
From this type of research, three assumptions about the 
process of innovation and diffusion can be derived:  
1. A high capacity for environmental policy is necessary for 
both policy innovation and the adoption of innovations. 
The OECD defines this broadly as “a society’s ability to 
identify and solve environmental problems” (OECD 1994: 
8). While the terms capacity and capacity building were 
used previously by numerous institutions such as UNEP, 
FAO, World Bank and OECD in connection with less de-
veloped countries only, they more recently have been 
fruitfully extended to apply to industrialised countries as 
well (Jänicke/Weidner 1997; Weidner/Jänicke 2001). Ca-
pacity refers to the structural preconditions for successful 
environmental policies and encompasses the collective 
actors (especially environmental institutions and organi-
sations). The structural preconditions include (a) the insti-
tutional set-up (e.g. open and effectively integrated politi-
cal institutions, administrative competence); (b) the sys-
tem of creation, transfer and application of knowledge; 
and (c) the economic-technical basis.  
2. The process of innovation and diffusion depends on the 
type of policy innovation and on the type of underlying 
problem. In general, technology-based policies diffuse 
faster than policies aimed at structural change. Pioneer-
ing national environmental policy is more likely to diffuse 
if it addresses environmental problems which are highly 
visible and on the international agenda, e.g. climate pro-
tection. Policy innovations which are naturally able to as-
sert themselves, e.g. distributive instruments (subsidies) 
or informational instruments, diffuse more rapidly than 
regulatory instruments (e.g. command and control) or re-
distributive policies (e.g. taxes).  
3. The diffusion of policies is frequently supported by inter-
national organisations. By spreading information about 
best practice, even weak organisations, which merely 
provide an international arena for national actors, rather 
than being international actors themselves (Underdal 
2001), have an opportunity for effective action. For ex-
ample, the OECD continuously evaluates, compares and 
benchmarks national policies, and in so doing success-
fully supports a convergence in policymaking without hav-
ing any formal legitimacy of its own.  









Policy induced diffusion Technology induced diffusion
• Technology forcing A ⇒ B ⇒ C ⇒ D • Technological initiative B ⇒ A ⇒ C ⇒ D
• Political initiative A ⇒ B ⇒ D ⇒ C • Technological dominance B ⇒ A ⇒ D ⇒ C
e.g. cadmium substitutes e.g. CHP technologies
• Political dominance A ⇒ C ⇒ B ⇒ D • Autonomous diffusion B ⇒ D
no example yet ? e.g. incremental improvements of energy efficiency
 
e.g. US-car emission standards (1970) e.g. wind energy
Source: Jänicke (2000) 
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The interplay between the diffusion of environmental policy 
measures and environmental technology can take a wide va-
riety of possible sequences. Figure 1 depicts a stage model 
of policy and technology invention and policy and technology 
diffusion. Theoretically, it is possible to distinguish between 
the following diffusion scenarios, depending on the factors 
leading to the political and technological innovations:  
• Technology forcing (A⇒B⇒C⇒D): A national environ-
mental policy innovation in one country forces a techno-
logical innovation which diffuses if the policy innovation 
also diffuses (e.g.: catalytic converter technology in cars). 
• Technological initiative (B⇒A⇒C⇒D): An existing envi-
ronmental technology induces a political innovation 
whose diffusion in turn encourages the diffusion of the 
technology (e.g.: wind energy in Denmark). 
• Political initiative (A⇒B⇒D⇒C): A national environ-
mental policy leads to technological innovations whose 
diffusion in turn encourages diffusion of the policy innova-
tion (e.g.: cadmium substitute). 1 
• Technological dominance (B⇒A⇒D⇒C): An innovation 
in environmental technology is successfully diffused and 
as a result receives political support both nationally and 
internationally (e.g.: combined heat and power in indus-
try). 2 
• Political dominance (A⇒C⇒B⇒D): The innovation in 
environmental policy is successfully diffused before a cor-
responding technology is available (this scenario is symp-
tomatically very rare in ecological modernisation). 
• Autonomous technological development (B⇒D): An in-
novation in environmental technology is successfully dif-
fused without political influence; this case, beyond incre-
mentally increasing energy efficiency in companies, 
seems to be rather rare. 
The mechanism of international diffusion of policy innova-
tions is favourable for the creation of lead markets for envi-
ronmental innovations. On the one hand, the convergence of 
standards and regulations implies – in the case of technol-
ogy-based policies – a widening of the market for technolo-
gies. On the other hand, the availability of technical solutions 
makes the diffusion of the corresponding policy innovation 
more likely. 
Technological innovations provide additional options for poli-
cymakers. Once their technical and economic feasibility 
have been proven, supporting policies are more readily 
adopted. In other cases, policy factors have been the major 
driving forces in the stimulation of environment-friendly tech-
nical innovations. Technology forcing has, however, been 
the exception in environmental innovation (cf. Conrad 1998; 
Jacob 1999). The other extreme – the autonomous emer-
gence and diffusion of innovations in environmental technol-
ogy – is the exception rather than the rule and such devel-
opments usually yield only limited incremental increases in 
efficiency. 
Technologies with advantages beyond environmental relief 
(e.g. cost reductions or users’ higher willingness to pay) are 
more likely than EOP technologies to be successful abroad, 
even in the absence of policy diffusion. There is evidence, 
however, that EOP technologies, in combination with sup-
porting regulation, diffuse in very similar manner. The tech-
nologies should address environmental problems of an in-
ternational nature, i.e. problems that are on the international 
agenda or at least occur in different regions of the world. We 
expect technologies developed under competitive market 
structures to be more successful. Industries already operat-
ing in world markets are most likely to yield successful inno-
vations.  
In addition to the factors mentioned above, we expect lead 
markets to originate in countries which have proven their 
technological competence at least in the particular field in 
question, are highly integrated in the world market, are good 
overall economic performers, and have an established repu-
tation as a pioneer in environmental policy.  
2.3 Pioneering policy from the perspective of environmental economics  
The influences derived above as determining lead markets 
for environmental innovations imply that the pioneering 
                                                 
1 The use of cadmium was regulated in Sweden in the early 
1980s, with their standards for substitutes being adopted by 
European industry. Not until the early 1990s, however, were 
these standards made binding by the European Commission 
(Bätcher/Böhm/Tötsch 1992). 
2 Combined heat and power (CHP) in industry spread largely 
autonomously, even though regulatory measures were intended 
to encourage its use in public power stations. 
country is the innovator not only of the technology, but also 
of the policy measures taken to stimulate the innovation and 
support its adoption. It is therefore crucial to understand why 
countries may be progressive in their environmental policy 
regulations, and under which circumstances these policies 
are successful in increasing the share of domestic compa-
nies in international markets and thus increasing national 
employment and incomes. A causal relationship between a 
strict pioneering environmental policy and a competitive ad-
vantage is the core of the Porter hypothesis, which became 
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prominent in the 1990s and is supported by a large body of 
case studies.  
Modern game theory-founded environmental economics 
supports the view that a strict environmental policy imple-
mented in advance of other countries – even while increas-
ing costs to regulated companies – can improve the competi-
tiveness of domestic enterprises under certain conditions 
(Ecchia/Mariotti 1994; Fees/Muehlheusser 2001; Fees/ Tais-
tra 2001; Taistra 2000; Ulph 1996; Ulph/Ulph 1996). Several 
different mechanisms are suggested as being responsible 
for this.  
Firstly, environmental policy can incite companies operating 
on oligopolistic international markets to behave more ag-
gressively by pressuring them to make credible commit-
ments to expand their market share. Foreign firms – if not 
supported by their governments – may then reduce their pro-
duction in order to avoid having to lower prices.  
Secondly, if economies of scale exist for suppliers due to 
learning, or for users of environmental technologies due to 
network effects, and the environmental policy diffuses to for-
eign countries, domestic firms can gain market share. It is 
important that foreign environmental policy neither follows 
too early, i.e. before economies of scale have become effec-
tive, nor too late, in which case domestic enterprises will 
bear higher costs than their foreign competitors over an ex-
tended period. Companies manufacturing environmental 
products are more likely to improve their competitiveness if 
foreign environmental policy is strict and foreign demand for 
environmental technology reacts strongly. For domestic us-
ers of environmental technology it is essential that foreign 
demand for their products does not strongly react to prices. 
Thirdly, if innovation offset exists, i.e. if the cost of compli-
ance is offset or more than offset by cost savings through in-
novation, the environmental policy stimulating such innova-
tion creates a cost advantage relative to foreign competitors, 
but only so long as environmental policy abroad does not fol-
low. It is not always apparent why environmental policy is 
necessary to motivate companies to invest in profitable inno-
vations. One possible reason is conflict between owners and 
management.  
Fourthly, greater willingness to pay for environmentally 
sound process technology or goods produced by environ-
mentally friendly means leads to increased competitiveness 
for suppliers or users of such technologies, respectively. 
2.4 Companies and strategic management  
To explain the emergence of innovations and their interna-
tional diffusion, it is not enough to examine country-specific 
factors or properties of an industrial sector alone, when only 
few companies compete internationally. The characteristics 
of firms must additionally be taken into account. Two ap-
proaches from management sciences which explain the stra-
tegic management of companies may be utilised in this con-
text: on the one side, Porter’s strategic positioning school 
and, on the other, the resource-based view (from static to 
more dynamic views). Strategic positioning builds on theo-
ries of industrial organisation, whereas the resource-based 
view builds on several research traditions, including, for ex-
ample, evolutionary theories. Furthermore, the resource-
based view may be interpreted as one part of a traditional 
SWOT analysis (strengths and weaknesses) and the strate-
gic positioning school as representing the other part (oppor-
tunities and threats) (Spanos/Spyros 2001; Rugman/Ver-
beke 1998). The following hypotheses build on these tradi-
tions, as well as on some lessons of the case studies. 
1. The strategic choices of a company take into account its 
positioning within a market, as well as the development of 
capabilities of the firm in a dynamic context.  
2. With regard to the environment, the strategic choices of 
companies must take into account the environmental pol-
icy of the home base, the national environmental policies 
of other countries and of the international arena, and the 
action of other societal and supranational actors in a dy-
namic framework.  
3. Companies therefore must decide either to develop 
“green” capabilities to comply with policy or, in the case of 
non-enforcement, not to react. The specific environmental 
policy and institutional context must be considered in this 
decision. Therefore, a general rule may not exist. The fol-
lowing matrix shows some possible interdependencies. 
Figure 2: Corporate Strategy with National and  
International Environmental Pressures 
Resource-based response to 



















Source: Rugman/Verbeke (1998). 
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4. From a dynamic perspective, the creation of a lead mar-
ket might start in quadrant 4 with the development of na-
tionally based capabilities and then – with the diffusion of 
environmental policies – move to quadrant 3, where na-
tional and international markets and capabilities are cre-
ated. 
5. Environmental policy is not independent of company ac-
tion. National environmental policymakers usually take 
into account the position of the firms in their country when 
negotiating international environmental agreements or the 
development of supranational environmental policy, e.g. 
in the European Union. 
6. Further differentiation is necessary with regard to envi-
ronmental innovations created in a pilot market. Is this 
development mainly driven by market forces, as sug-
gested by the lead market theory, or by regulatory meas-
ures? In both cases, the strategic situation of firms must 
be taken into account. 
7. Multinational enterprises with production locations in vari-
ous countries must comply with different policy patterns 
and societal behaviour, and must react to these different 
challenges. They must make strategic choices; they have 
the possibility of learning from the varying circumstances, 
creating special corporate capabilities and thus playing 
an important role in the diffusion of technological as well 
as organisational innovations, and may further create 
“green” corporate capabilities. It must be taken into ac-
count that the context of “green” innovations (especially 
the creation of a lead market) might not be the place of 
production. One main reason for this is the transferability 
of innovations between contexts, especially by multina-
tional companies. 
3 Towards an Integrated Model of the Lead Market for Environmental 
Innovations 
The emergence of lead markets for environmental innova-
tions cannot be explained by a single disciplinary approach. 
All of the distinct theoretical approaches, defined by their 
methodologies and their respective subjects of research as 
described above, contribute to the analysis of this phenome-
non. In this paper we attempt to integrate the approaches in 
a multi-level analytical framework (Figure 3). 
The framework, however, is not a deterministic one. The fac-
tors which can influence lead markets for environmental in-
novations, as derived from the theoretical discussion above, 
are expected  to be positively correlated statistically with the 
emergence of a lead market. The statistical validation is not 
examined in this paper. Instead, we report the results of 
several case studies to illustrate the national factors respon-
sible for the international diffusion of the environmental inno-
vations analysed.  
This new model of international diffusion of environmental 
innovations should explain the internationalisation of envi-
ronmental innovations compared to national adoption without 
international diffusion. We utilise the lead market factors as 
the main explanatory factors for the internationalisation 
process.3 The reason for this is that international diffusion, in 
contrast to national diffusion, cannot be directly explained by 
policies, but only by economic or political reasoning, as no 
actor or policy has the power to pressure all companies 
                                                 
3  The stage model in figure 3 is a complementary taxonomy that 
includes the sequence of policy and innovation diffusion but is 
not explanatory. 
world-wide to adopt an innovation. The theory integration is 
accomplished by integrating the additional arguments for en-
vironmental innovations into the lead market factors (policy 
diffusion, Porter effect) and modelling the impact of actors 
and policies on the lead market factors.  
The policy level consists of actors and policies. It comprises 
a range of different national and international actors. It in-
cludes governmental and economic actors, as well as NGOs 
and their respective international organisations. The role of 
multinational companies in the international diffusion of envi-
ronmental innovations by the various means described 
above is located at this level. All actors, their interests, their 
specific resources, and their corresponding strategies form a 
policy pattern (Blazejczak et al. 1999). This encompasses 
instrumentation (such as emissions control legislation, tax 
regimes, subsidies for specific technologies, etc.), policy 
style, and the configuration of the involved actors. Our case 
studies, which we describe below, confirm the need to look 
beyond single policy instruments and to consider the frame-
work in which the policy measures are applied. 
The elements of the policy level can have a direct influence 
on the willingness of a country to adopt innovations. This re-
lationship is marked with (1) in Figure 3. Our analysis of the 
relationship between a policy pattern and the willingness to 
innovate builds on the results of a preceding research pro-
ject (Klemmer et al. 1999). The Klemmer project focuses on 
the likelihood that innovations occur at the national level. Yet 
it does not elaborate under which circumstances an interna-
tional diffusion of innovations occurs. The traditional impact 
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of policies on the adoption of innovations in a country (1) is 
not sufficient to account for the distinction between lead 
markets and idiosyncratic innovation markets that adopt in-
novations not adopted by other countries. This can be 
achieved only by the inclusion of the lead market factors. 
Our further analysis should reveal to what extent policy pat-
terns and actors have an influence on the internationalisation 
factors of environmental innovations (marked as (2) in Figure 
3). 
The internationalisation factors constitute the second level of 
the model. We argue that the environmental policy-specific 
arguments can in principle be assigned to the five lead mar-
ket factors elaborated in innovation economics and de-
scribed in section 2.1. The analysis within innovation eco-
nomics has focused on the relationship between the lead 
market factors and the potential of a country to lead the 
adoption of a specific innovation design internationally 
(marked as (3) in Figure 3). These factors are likely to im-
prove the chances for an innovation to diffuse internationally 
(marked as (4) in Figure 3). To apply the model for environ-
mental innovations, the lead market factors are adapted to 
the specific context of environmental innovations. The fact 
that policies diffuse between nation states or are harmonised 
in international organisations provides an additional strong 
factor in favour of the internationalisation of environmental 
innovations. Policy diffusion internationalises other innova-
tions as well, such as pharmaceuticals or product safety im-
provements. The traditional lead market model integrates the 
arguments for international policy diffusion as a transfer ad-
vantage (Beise 2001: 102). The regulatory context of coun-
tries seen as pacesetters in the development of environ-
mental policy is often transferred to other countries that are 
risk-averse. Such a pacesetter position may be gained either 
through innovativeness or through an important role in inter-
national organisations. In environmental innovations, policy 
diffusion plays such a prominent role that we add it as an ex-
tra internationalisation factor. 
Figure 3: Framework for Analysing the International Diffusion of Environmentally Responsive Innovations  


































































































The market structure advantage, which describes competi-
tion as the most important factor in pushing innovations, is 
interpreted in the context of environmental innovations as 
the “Porter effect”. The Porter effect is the main argument in 
environmental economics to explain why, in the absence of 
policy diffusion, national regulation leads to global innova-
tions. The main idea of the market structure advantage is 
that there are innovation opportunities hidden in the techno-
logical opportunity space and that market forces push com-
panies to discover those opportunities. The greater the com-
petition, the more likely it is that companies will discover 
profitable innovation opportunities. Porter and van der Linde 
(1995) argue that environmental innovations can also be 
profitable, but that, due to complacency, companies often do 
not pursue them. Environmental innovations, however, are 
driven less by competition than by regulatory means. To de-
note these differences, we refer to the market structure ad-
vantage as the Porter effect. The open question is what 
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kinds of regulations can push companies to develop innova-
tions that are profitable in foreign countries as well as in the 
domestic market.  
The internationalisation mechanisms are based on country-
specific attributes. They can, however, be influenced by 
various political and public actors and policies. For example, 
a tax regime can actively change factor prices for energy, 
pushing a country to the forefront of an international factor 
cost trend. Multinational companies can have a large impact 
on the international transfer of innovations and policy diffu-
sion; international organisations can spur policy diffusion, 
which contributes to lead effect.  
The framework illustrated in Figure 3 can be used to analyse 
the impact of policies on the lead market role of countries in 
environmentally responsive industries. It complements the 
traditional relationship between the policy level and the na-
tional adoption of innovations. The determinants of the lead 
market role of a country are modelled as a function of its 
lead market factors (relationship 3 in Figure 3). The lead 
market factors themselves are determined by the policy level 
(relationship 2).  
The framework can be used to analyse the effects of policies 
and actors on the adoption and international diffusion of in-
novations. Its advantage over former studies of environ-
mental regulation is that it makes a clear distinction between 
national and international adoption. With the help of the lead 
market concept of the international diffusion of innovations, 
this distinction can be theoretically substantiated. The origi-
nal concept put the reasons for the international success of 
innovations down to theoretical attributes of countries. The 
traditional policy analysis focused on the effect of policies 
and styles on national innovation development and adoption. 
Our reformulation within the framework of environmental in-
novations emphasises the role of policies and actors on the 
internationalisation of innovations. Relationships (1), (3) and 
(4) are not only validated by theoretical reasoning, but sup-
ported by a rich literature, as well as by the results of our 
case studies. If these relationships are accepted, the next 
steps in research can concentrate on relationship (2). From 
the causal relations observed, we are particularly interested 
in drawing conclusions as to how policy patterns can be de-
signed which are likely to stimulate environmental innova-
tions that diffuse to other countries.  
4 Case Studies of Lead Markets from Literature Studies  
From these distinct theoretical perspectives, altogether 13 
cases of environmental technologies and organisational in-
novations in the literature were explored with regard to their 
pioneering and lead markets. The selection criteria for the 
case studies were mainly pragmatic. The cases had to be 
well documented in the literature, they had to represent mar-
ketable environmental innovations, and a wide variety of 
sectors and countries had to be included. The case studies 
followed a common questionnaire asking for: (1) a descrip-
tion of the innovation design, the lead market, the regulatory 
measures taken in the pioneering country, and the actors in-
volved; (2) an analysis of the lead market factors of the 
country; (3) the lead market factors of the innovation; and (4) 
the lead market factors of the policies supporting innovation 
and diffusion. In the following, a summary is presented of 
those case studies in which the phenomena of lead markets 
are most obvious.  
4.1 Fuel-efficient passenger cars  
Fuel-efficiency is a means of reducing the emission of 
greenhouse or other harmful gases. Fuel-efficient passenger 
cars are cars that consume a low level of fuel per 100 km. 
They are powered by petrol or hydrogen, or are equipped 
with both petrol and electric engines (hybrid cars). In Ger-
many the most fuel-efficient cars are known as “3-Liter-
Autos”, meaning that they consume less than 4 litres per 100 
km. In the 1990s this limit was a realistic goal for most car 
manufacturers in the context of European driving habits and 
design preferences, and policies such as favourable tax 
treatment were introduced to support it. Since the end of the 
1990s, there have been several German car models that are 
within this low consumption limit. 
Modern fuel-efficient passenger cars use a bundle of tech-
nologies aimed at reducing fuel consumption. The most ef-
fective technologies in reducing fuel consumption are the 
use of low-weight materials, the enhancement of the aero-
dynamics of the car body, and the optimisation of the com-
bustion process. The latter has been the development path 
most frequently taken, partly because it is the most efficient 
and partly because of market preferences. Indeed, cars have 
become heavier over time and body design must follow 
safety as well as aesthetic criteria (Franke 1998). Among 
motor technologies, high-pressure direct injection, and in 
particular the common-rail injection system, has been the 
most successful since the 1990s. High-pressure injection 
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improves combustion and lowers the emission of exhaust 
gases while increasing the car’s performance, notably its ac-
celeration. In diesel engines high-pressure injection became 
almost standard during the 1990s (Figure 4 International Dif-
fusion of Diesel Pressure Injection). The modern injection 
systems were developed by several car companies in 
Europe and Japan. Germany was the lead market. The US 
and Japanese markets lagged in this technical change, since 
the proportion and reputation of diesel-powered cars are 
much lower in these countries (Petersen/Diaz-Bone 1998). 
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There are only few policy instruments in the automobile in-
dustry that directly stipulate the fuel consumption of cars. 
The US introduced a fuel economy rule (CAFE) for new cars 
in 1975, and is the sole country to have passed such legisla-
tion. For all companies selling cars in the US, it sets as a 
minimum fuel-efficiency requirement the average consump-
tion of all cars sold in one year, or 8.77 litres per 100 km. Up 
to now, this rule has not been adopted by other countries. In 
Europe, a voluntary fleet consumption reduction plan by the 
European Automobile Manufacturers Association prevented 
its establishment in legislation. One of the reasons that this 
regulation has not diffused internationally is that it has 
proven ineffective. Its main weakness is that it does not af-
fect demand. Firstly, automakers have the option of violating 
the rules and paying fines if demand favours less fuel-
efficient car designs. Secondly, there is a loophole in the law 
that coincided dramatically with a market trend in the US. 
Light trucks, which became the most successful models in 
the US, were granted a much higher limit (11.63 litres per 
100 km). Light trucks now account for more than 50% of all 
sales and 41% of oil consumed. The effect of CAFE on fuel 
consumption has therefore been low or even negative, since 
the market share of light trucks has increased dramatically. 
US cars still consume fuel at the highest rates in the world. 
There are few incentives for consumers to buy fuel-efficient 
cars. Correspondingly, there is no demand for fuel-efficiency 
and no incentive for car producers to lower average fuel 
consumption below the threshold (Bommer 1996). 
Legislation in the auto industry is mainly aimed at reducing 
exhaust gases from passenger cars. Specific regulations 
vary from country to country, however, with the effect that 
different engine technologies have proven most efficient, de-
pending on the given emissions requirements. In the United 
States, emissions-reduction policies specifically target harm-
ful gases such as NOx, while in Europe regulations focus on 
CO2, the gas primarily responsible for the greenhouse effect. 
Since CO2 emission is directly proportionate to the volume of 
fuel consumed, a reduction in CO2 is only possible through 
higher motor fuel-efficiency. NOx, on the other hand, can be 
reduced by catalytic converters and improved combustion 
processes without decreasing fuel consumption. The Euro-
pean regulation therefore applies direct pressure for higher 
automobile fuel-efficiency. Another effect of these differ-
ences is that diesel engine technology was boosted by 
European legislation, while the US rules discourage the 
adoption of diesel cars. Diesel engines are the most eco-
nomic combustion motors today. The limit of three litres of 
fuel per 100 km is only achievable through modern diesel 
technology. However, diesel engines have higher NOx emis-
sions than comparable petrol engines. Diesel engines are 
therefore not an attractive technology for US car manufac-
turers aiming to follow US emissions regulations with as little 
R&D as possible. Yet, as diesel engines are the most prom-
ising technology to reduce fuel consumption in the short 
term, European automakers have concentrated intensive 
R&D effort on refining diesel engines to achieve reductions 
not only in CO2, but in NOx as well.   
What factors made the fuel-efficiency innovations adopted in 
Europe more successful? Firstly, Europe has the highest fuel 
prices in the world, making such innovation most beneficial 
there. Yet, while there is a global trend of increasing petrol 
prices, the differences, especially between some European 
states and the US, are still so great that fuel-efficiency alone 
cannot persuade US consumers to adopt the innovation. The 
only innovations to have diffused internationally are those 
that do not just reduce fuel consumption, but also enhance 
other attributes of the car in keeping with global passenger 
car design trends. Over time, cars have become heavier, 
more luxurious and more powerful. High-pressure direct in-
jection has proven to be a great improvement in diesel en-
gines, which previously suffered from low performance. The 
main reason for the international success was neither the 
fuel-efficiency legislation, nor the other environmental factors 
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that make fuel consumption more economical, but the gen-
eral lead market attributes of the European market, which is 
often at the forefront of vehicle technology. Since the bene-
fits of fuel-efficient technologies for the car owner are still low 
in the US, only innovations that offer additional benefits dif-
fuse world-wide. This internationalisation mechanism is 
close to the Porter hypothesis: Pressure for environmentally 
responsive innovations in a market context that is most de-
manding, sophisticated and has a good international reputa-
tion leads to the development of technologies that appeal to 
users in other countries, even in the absence of an interna-
tional diffusion of policies. Fuel-efficient technologies are 
employed not only in small or micro-compact cars, the proto-
type of a fuel-efficient car, but also in large luxurious cars 
such as Mercedes-Benz. These cars are more successful in-
ternationally than any other type, and it can be expected that 
the most successful fuel-efficient car will be a midsize sedan 
rather than the 3-litre cars currently available. 
4.2 Wind energy 
The world market for renewable energies and especially 
wind energy has increased rapidly over the past decades, 
due to the oil crisis in the 1970s and the ensuing discussion 
of environmental impacts due to fossil fuels. This developing 
world market is dominated by two countries: Denmark, the 
pioneering country in wind-generated electricity, and Ger-
many, the market with the largest installed wind energy ca-
pacity in the world. Denmark is the world’s largest exporter 
of wind turbine generators, as is shown in Figure 5. As the 
comparison of the import and export markets of the two 
countries shows, Germany exports only a small part of its 
wind turbines to other countries (DEWI 2000). Whereas Den-
mark’s wind energy industry is world market-oriented, its 
German counterpart depends more on domestic demand 
and regulation (Denmark: 81% exports, 19% imports; Ger-
many: 10% exports, 90% imports).  
International Diffusion of Wind Energy shows the penetration 
rate of wind energy use in different countries (measured as 
exploitation of wind potential) and identifies Denmark as the 
lead market. 
Figure 5: World Market Share of Wind Energy  









DK GER USA INDIA NL SPAIN JAPAN
1995 1996 1997 1998 2000
%
Source: BTM Consult http://www.btm.dk/Statistics.htm 
Denmark looks back on a long history of technical develop-
ment of the wind mill. As early as 1918, 120 Danish energy 
utilities had a wind mill with a typical size of 20 to 35 kW, ac-
counting for 3 percent of the country’s total electricity pro-
duction. The “Danish concept” is traditionally characterised 
by three rotor blades. Beginning in the 1950s, direct current 
generator plants were replaced by generators producing al-
ternating current (the corresponding modern version is the 
asynchronous generator). The third typical feature, the mod-
ern wind energy converter, was also developed before the oil 
crisis. Today’s converting systems are equipped either with 
pitch or active stall regulators, two different techniques for 
increasing flexibility of response to changing wind forces.  








75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Wind energy usage








Source: IEA/OECD (2002), Lehmann/Reetz (1995) 
While wind energy was long regarded as too expensive to 
compete with fossil fuels, the situation changed during the oil 
crisis. Several countries began to install big wind power 
plants of one megawatt or more, such as the GROWIAN in 
Germany. The plants failed, however, as they were eco-
nomically inefficient. The main criterion in the technological 
development of such large wind power plants was their 
compatibility with the existing system of large, centralised 
fossil and nuclear energy plants. Energy utilities had no in-
centive to undermine their established system by developing 
a decentralised alternative system of renewable energies. 
Today GROWIAN is often cited as a project undertaken by 
actors who wanted to demonstrate the unfeasibility of wind 
energy, an indicator that wind energy development in Ger-
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many was not guided by economic reasonableness. In con-
trast, the technological development of wind energy in Den-
mark was characterised by more variety and flexibility. Al-
though some experiments with large wind power plants were 
undertaken, the industrial and economic breakthrough was 
achieved through the continuous improvement of smaller 
converters. The new class of 55-kilowatt wind turbine gen-
erators developed in 1980-81 reduced costs by about 50 
percent. In the 1980s many technology support programmes 
were set up all over the world, e.g. in California. Thousands 
of Danish Micon 55-kilowatt wind turbines were exported to 
Palm Springs. The Danish producers had the first-mover ad-
vantage, which they had gained when they started industrial 
production of wind turbines five years earlier than their com-
petitors (http://www.windpower.dk). Since the 1980s, the 
size of wind turbines has increased continuously. This is the 
globally dominant technical trajectory and may lead to gen-
erators as big as GROWIAN. But at all times, the generator 
predominantly used in the Danish market has also been the 
most commercially successful design world-wide. The Dan-
ish market took a realistic and economically rational ap-
proach to wind energy.  
In Europe, three different strategies for supporting wind en-
ergy can be observed (Langraf/Kellner 2000; Haas et al. 
2000): 
• renewable energy feed tariffs (REFITs), 
• bidding systems, and  
• tradable permit systems for renewables. 
Some countries have implemented systems with additional 
incentives, such as tax reductions or specific depreciation 
privileges for renewable energies. 
Renewable energy feed tariffs (REFITs) have been imple-
mented in Germany, Denmark, Spain, Italy and Austria, and 
have also been used temporarily in Ireland (until 1994) and 
the Netherlands (until 1995). This system introduces fixed 
prices for green electricity bought by energy utilities from 
producers of renewable energy. Thus, the system can be 
described as a subsidy for wind energy. The REFITs system 
has fallen under criticism, since it is in conflict with the cur-
rent trend of liberalising energy markets. Its main advantage 
is the low risk for investors, which has lead to a wind energy 
boom in countries with REFITs systems. On the other hand, 
this is also a disadvantage, since the competitive pressure 
on producers is low, too. This may lead to a system with 
higher costs for wind energy compared to a more competi-
tive system. 
Bidding systems have been implemented in the United King-
dom, France and, since 1995, Ireland. Competition among 
electricity producers is created by calls for tender from an 
agency representing the government. Energy utilities are ob-
ligated to buy a fixed amount of renewable energy per year 
from different sources. The quantity is set by the authority, 
and suppliers with the lowest price are selected to produce 
it. Energy utilities are compensated for additional costs by a 
national levy on energy which must be paid by all energy 
consumers. The bidding system leads to high competitive 
pressure and low costs and prices. In 1997 average wind 
energy prices in Germany were twice as high as in the 
United Kingdom. In the bidding system, only the best wind 
locations have a chance of succeeding. The prices of the 
REFITs system are higher, since they are oriented to esti-
mated average costs of wind energy. One problem with bid-
ding systems is the high risk for investors, compounded by 
an application process that is often characterised as expen-
sive, time-consuming and bureaucratic. A further problem is 
the lack of continuity, since bidding conditions are subject to 
frequent change. Consequently, no significant wind industry 
could be established in any country with a bidding system. 
Up to now, systems of green tradable permits for renewable 
energies have been introduced only in the Netherlands. 
Other countries, such as Denmark, are planning to switch 
from the REFITs system to tradable permits in the near fu-
ture. Tradable permits combine the efficiency gains of bid-
ding systems with the advantages of REFITs systems 
(achieving environmental goals by means of fixed targets for 
renewable energy development). The state sets quotas for 
renewable energies and issues certificates to companies 
producing the kind of green energy desired. The certificates 
can be traded on the market. Energy utilities are obligated to 
hold a certain percentage of renewable energy in their port-
folio, i.e. they must either buy a certain amount of renew-
ables certificates on the market or produce green electricity 
themselves. 
Substantial differences can be identified when the regulation 
systems are related to the development of a national wind 
industry (Haas et al. 2000). In countries with the REFITs sys-
tem, the wind industry developed rapidly, namely in Den-
mark, Germany, Italy, Austria and Spain, and, up to 1994 
and 1995, respectively, also in Ireland and the Netherlands. 
In countries with bidding systems, wind energy use has de-
veloped very slowly, independent of existing wind resources. 
In France, the United Kingdom and Ireland the wind industry 
is poorly developed, despite an abundance of coastal re-
gions with high wind potentials. Finally, the system of trad-
able permits for green electricity is still too young for an 
evaluation of its impact on the wind industry. 
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4.3 Substitutes for CFCs in domestic refrigerators 
CFCs are chemicals used as, among other things, coolants 
in refrigerators and blowing agents for insulating foam. In the 
late 1970s they came under the suspicion of damaging the 
ozone layer. This led to the steady development of an inter-
national regime aiming to phase out and replace these sub-
stances. There are three primary substitutes available: 1) 
partially chlorinated HCFCs, 2) non-chlorinated HFCs, with 
HFC 134a as the most prominent chemical, and 3) natural 
gases such as butane or propane (HCs).  
The first class of chemicals, partially chlorinated HCFCs, 
have a small remaining ozone depletion potential (ODP) and 
are therefore considered to be a viable alternative only for a 
transitional period. In the long term, amendments to the 
ozone regime require the phasing out of these chemicals as 
well. The second option, HFCs, was favoured by the chemi-
cal industries in both the US and, initially, Europe. This class 
of chemicals has been known since the 1950s. Considerable 
research efforts have been undertaken and advances in 
production technologies made under threat of regulation 
and, especially in the US, the fear of expensive skin cancer 
liability cases. The US-based corporation DuPont has been 
a leader in this area. The driving force for the search for 
substitutes was the early commitment of the company to 
stop production, should the suspected damaging potential of 
CFCs be confirmed. The company’s search for alternatives 
is reflected in the rising expenditures for R&D in this field 
(Grundmann 1999: 254) and the large share of related pat-
ents held by the company (Oberthür 1997: 93). The US was 
also the first country to prohibit the use of CFCs as propel-
lants. Taken in 1977, this measure gave momentum to the 
search for an alternative for other applications as well. 
The prospect of a technically and economically feasible al-
ternative for CFCs accelerated the negotiations of the global 
regulations laid down in the Montreal Protocol of 1986. Du-
Pont supported global regulation of CFCs from 1986 on, 
while European manufacturers such as Hoechst opposed it, 
since European producers lagged behind in the development 
of substitutes. But the European position changed gradually 
from the mid-1980s onwards. As a result, the world produc-
tion of CFCs has declined steadily.  
Whereas the US favoured the second class of substitutes, 
HFCs, the third alternative, HCs, became dominant in 
Europe. While HFCs do not harm the ozone layer, they do 
hold considerable global warming potential, and are there-
fore criticised by environmentalists. At the beginning of the 
1990s, Greenpeace Germany initiated the development of a 
refrigerator which employed hydrocarbons (HCs) as coolants 
and blowing agents. The major refrigerator manufacturers 
initially resisted this technology due to the combustibility of 
the gases. However, shortly after a small producer, in col-
laboration with a university institute, developed a prototype 
which met safety standards and Greenpeace started a public 
campaign in support of this company, the major German 
manufacturers adopted this technology (e.g. Lohbeck in 
1999). German manufacturers converted to HC technology 
at their foreign production sites as well. Bosch-Siemens, for 
example, now produces on an HC basis in all of its subsidi-
aries. Electrolux switched to HC technology for the European 
market. Meanwhile, this technology has also been adopted 
by low-cost producers such as the Italian manufacturer 
Candy, which switched in 1999. Other manufacturers that 
have converted to HC technology are based in countries as 
diverse as Sweden, Denmark, France, Japan, Turkey, India, 
China and Cuba.  
Currently, all three refrigerator coolant alternatives are on 
the market: CFCs are still produced in developing countries 
such as China and India; HFCs have gained a large market 
share in North America, Japan and Southern Europe; and 
HCs have become the dominant chemical for refrigerators 
for domestic use in Northern Europe. In Germany, the mar-
ket share of HC technology is reported to have already 
reached 100% (World Bank et al. 1996). In Japan HFC has 
become the predominant technology for refrigerants, but HC 
is utilised as well. As of 2000, approximately 40% of blowing 
agents used in refrigerator production were based on HFCs, 
while 60% utilised HC (Little 2002). The jury is still out as to 
whether one of these two alternatives will become globally 
dominant, but HC has strong potential to become the global 
choice. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on data and estimates 
of Sicars (1995). 
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There is a lack of current data on the market penetration of 
HC technology. Its diffusion between 1992 and 1996 in 
Germany and Europe as a whole, the countries leading the 
international development, is shown in the following graph. It 
should be noted, however, that the German data is included 
in that of Europe. There are many signs that HC market 
penetration in other countries has also advanced considera-
bly by now, and that a diffusion is taking place, particularly to 
less-developed countries (e.g. World Bank 1996).  
In the mid-1990s, HC technology had made few inroads out-
side of Western Europe. Minor applications were reported 
from Eastern Europe, Japan, China and Oceania, whereas 
most producers in Central and South America, Africa and 
Asia continued to use CFCs (UNEP 1998). In recent years, 
however, the share of HC-based refrigerators has grown 
significantly. According to a Greenpeace study, in 2000 there 
were more than 55 million HC refrigerators in operation 
world-wide (Maté n.d.). This represents a share of roughly 
10%. Lohbeck estimated the 1999 world-wide production to 
be about 15 million units annually, or a market share of 
around 20% (Lohbeck 1999).  
A considerable increase is owed to a conversion made by 
large Chinese manufacturers. It is reported that two Chinese 
manufacturers (Kelon and Haier) have almost completely 
switched their annual production of 2.5 million units to HC 
technology. This gives China the largest share of HC tech-
nology outside Europe (Lohbeck 1999). The conversion in 
China was supported by the German and Swiss governmen-
tal development agencies, by Greenpeace, and by the Ger-
man manufacturer Liebherr.   
Other German development assistance projects were started 
in India to develop a plant based on HC technology which 
was planned to be finished in the late 1990s (Sicars 1999). 
Campaigning by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth also 
took place in African countries and in Australia. The 
Swiss/German development projects were supported by the 
World Bank and were part of the “Multilateral Fund” (MF) 
that was set up in the framework of the Montreal Protocol to 
finance conversion to CFC-free technologies. Countries in 
the South are particularly interested in HC technology, be-
cause there are no licence fees to be paid as there are for 
the patented HFC technologies.  
Despite the early lead in the conversion from CFCs, in the 
US the HC campaigning has not been successful. A recent 
study comparing the HFC and HC technologies argues that 
the US producers are unlikely to adopt this technology be-
cause US manufacturers are concerned that even a small 
risk of accidents due to the flammability of HCs may result in 
large financial claims and product liability insurance cost 
could increase significantly (Little 2002). The predominant 
type of refrigerator in the US is not only considerably larger, 
but also has an automatic rather than manual defrost sys-
tem, which would lead to higher safety requirements if HC 
technology were applied. Furthermore, it is more difficult to 
meet the mandatory energy-efficiency standards with HC 
technology. The same study argues that the overall contribu-
tion of HFCs to global warming is only of minor importance 
as compared to CO2. This view of important barriers in the 
US market is countered by other authors, mainly based on 
the European experience, with almost no accidents, im-
provements in energy efficiency, and a switch to automatic 
defrost as well (overview in Lorentzen 1995).  
Despite Greenpeace’s campaign in favour of HC technolo-
gies and the above-mentioned government projects to sup-
port their adoption in developing countries, there are few 
countries with policies that discourage the use of HFCs or 
favour HC. Although HFCs are affected by the Kyoto Proto-
col due to of their global warming potential (GWP), specific 
policies are rare. The Danish Environmental Protection 
Agency published a plan to phase out their use, along with 
that of other fluorinated gases, by 2006. French climate 
change strategy covers HFCs and proposes voluntary 
agreements for their reduction, as well as an extension of 
the planned CO2 tax in accordance with their GWP. The UK 
draft climate change programme states as a general princi-
ple that HFCs should be avoided wherever acceptable alter-
natives are available. The Netherlands specifies a reduction 
target of 23%. In other countries (Germany, Belgium, Aus-
tria), subnational regulations are in place to reduce the use 
of HFCs. Ecolabels are planned in Austria, and are imple-
mented for refrigerators in Germany (Anderson 2000).  
The main driver for innovation in the lead country, Germany, 
has been the campaigning by Greenpeace. Their activities 
have also been important for the diffusion of HC technology 
in Europe and in developing countries. This diffusion was 
promoted by development aid projects sponsored by the 
Multilateral Fund, and by the adoption of this technology by 
German producers in their foreign subsidiaries as well as at 
home. It is too early to tell whether this technology will be 
adopted in the US as well, but European experience and 
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4.4 Chlorine-reduced pulp production 
In the process of producing pulp from woodchips one major 
problem is to reduce the lignin content of the pulp as much 
as possible (delignification). This has an immediate impact 
on the pulp quality. The brightness of the resulting paper (or 
cardboard) depends on the percentage to which the lignin 
parts have been separated. At the same time, the strength of 
the pulp should not be reduced. By far the largest amount of 
the lignin content is separated out during the so-called cook-
ing, a thermo-chemical step in the pulp production process. 
The lignin content is further reduced in an additional step 
called bleaching.  
Up to the 1980s, the production of pulp was (predominantly) 
based on the use of elementary chlorine in bleaching. In the 
mid-1980s it became known that the use of elementary chlo-
rine leads to the generation of environmentally highly prob-
lematic chlorine compounds, such as dioxin.  
When awareness increased of the danger of organochlori-
nes – which can only be reduced through in-process tech-
nologies – Scandinavian mills were best able to adopt these 
technologies, as they were not locked in to secondary waste 
water treatment facilities. Additionally, their experience in 
developing in-process technologies to reduce overall waste 
streams put Scandinavian suppliers of pulp production tech-
nologies in a favourable position to respond to the demand 
for equipment to reduce chlorinated organic emissions. 
The improvement in the competitiveness of Scandinavian 
suppliers has not been detected in analyses of trade data, 
however (Scholz/Stähler 1999). One possible interpretation 
offered by the authors is that in the pulp and paper industry 
the diffusion of innovations occurs via imitation rather than 
through trade of equipment. It can also be argued, however, 
that trade data on equipment for pulp and paper production 
thus far investigated are too aggregated to detect improve-
ments in individual segments of the equipment market.  
Several technologies with the potential to reduce chlorinated 
organic emissions have been developed and are applied in 
large-scale production facilities. 
• In the technology for extended delignification, additional 
lignin removal is achieved by lengthening the cooking 
process. Pulping chemicals, which are largely recovered, 
are used here as functional substitutes for bleaching 
chemicals, which have to be disposed of. The technology 
was developed in Sweden by the research institute STFI 
and commercialised by Kamyr/Kvaerner (Sweden) for the  
– more common – continuous cooking processes and by 
Beloit (US) and Sunds Defibrator (Sweden) for the – usu-
ally older – batch processes. Retrofitting existing plants is 
possible in most cases, but involves high capital costs. 
The process results in reduced operating costs compared 
to conventional processes. 
• Oxygen delignification technology uses an additional 
oxygen reactor between the pulping and bleaching step, 
to remove additional lignin in an alkaline environment. 
This technology can be integrated with extended delig-
nification in one process line. Kamyr/Kvaerner (Sweden) 
and Sunds Defibrator (Sweden) developed and manufac-
tured much of the technology. It is also characterised by 
high capital costs and reduced operating costs. Although 
retrofitting is possible, the introduction of the technology 
is more profitable when used in building up new capacity. 
One disadvantage is a reduction in pulp quality due to 
strength degradation. The supply of cheap oxygen in Ja-
pan encouraged diffusion of oxygen delignification in that 
country. In the US, the advantage of reduced levels of 
BOD, which is connected with this technology, could not 
be exploited, as most facilities were already equipped 
with biological treatment systems (due to former strict 
regulation of water emissions). 
• Ozone delignification technology uses ozone as bleach-
ing agent. Ozone has to be produced on-site, which ac-
counts for a significant part of total capital cost. The proc-
ess results in very low emissions, because all effluent can 
be recycled. It was developed by the pulp and paper 
company Union Camp (US) to meet regulatory demands 
under specific natural conditions for its Franklin mill. The 
technology was marketed in a joint venture with Sunds 
Defibrator (Sweden). Its installation requires high capital 
costs and results in reduced operating costs, especially 
for softwoods. Integrated with oxygen and/or extended 
delignification upstream, the technology allows the pro-
duction of TCF pulp. 
• The substitution of chlorine dioxide for chlorine at a 
higher rate is a proven technology to reduce the forma-
tion of chlorinated organics. The technology is compara-
tively cheap and easy to retrofit. It results in moderately 
increased operating costs, because chlorine dioxide is 
more expensive than chlorine. Chlorine dioxide must be 
produced on-site. The problem of generating by-products 
in excess of plant needs has been reduced by new solu-
tions. Installation in the US is driven by increasingly strict 
regulation. The highly corrosive chlorine compounds limit 
the potential for effluent recycling and conflict with the 
long-term prospect of a zero-emission or eco-cyclic pulp 
mill. 
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The complete substitution of chlorine dioxide for elementary 
chlorine results in elementary chlorine-free, or ECF pulp. A 
combination of technologies for extended cooking, oxygen 
and/or ozone delignification is the basis for producing totally 
chlorine free, or TCF pulp. The first TCF pulp was produced 
in Sweden in 1990 by a small producer. Large-volume pro-
ducers soon followed suit.  
The diffusion of pulp production technologies can be de-
scribed by looking at the production volumes of pulp differen-
tiated by chlorine use in production. In the US, diffusion 
started only in 1990, but has increased steadily since then. 
As can be seen in figure 8, the diffusion of chlorine-reduced 
technologies started much earlier in Scandinavia and had al-
ready reached 100% of production by the mid-nineties. The 
role of Scandinavia as lead market for chlorine-reduced pulp 
production is underpinned by these data. 
With regard to the distinction of ECF and TCF pulp, it is ob-
vious that TCF plays a significant role in Scandinavia but not 
in the US. The share of TCF pulp did not increase from 1995 
even in Scandinavia. The early diffusion of TCF was sup-
ported to a large extent by Greenpeace campaigns which 
resulted in strong demand for chlorine-free paper in Europe, 
especially in Germany (indirect demand effect). Since these 
campaigns levelled off, incentives for a further diffusion of 
TCF have seemed to be missing. 
Figure 8: International Diffusion of ECF and TCF Pulp (Location of Production) 
 
 
In the 1970s the US led environmental regulation of the pulp 
and paper industry. Regulation required that manufacturers 
adopt BAT to avoid the release of conventional pollutants, 
such as suspended solids and oxygen-demanding organic 
materials. These requirements could only be met by the in-
stallation of primary and secondary waste water treatment 
facilities, which was very costly. 
In Scandinavia, specifically in Sweden, requirements with 
respect to conventional pollutants came later and were more 
lenient. Compared to the US, comparatively few mills were 
required to install secondary treatment of effluents. This was 
due to the high assimilative capacity for conventional pollut-
ants of the large bodies of water into which mills discharged 
in Sweden. It was possible to meet the Swedish require-
ments through in-process modifications, which reduced 
overall waste streams. Swedish environmental regulations 
are shaped by the country’s participation in international 
agreements, such as the Helsinki Convention (Baltic Sea 
Convention) signed in 1974. 
Once secondary treatment was installed, the benefits of TCF 
processes such as oxygen and ozone bleaching were re-
duced to avoid the release of chlorinated organics; the addi-
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tional benefits of reduced conventional pollutants – through 
lower waste loads, which emerged out of the possibility of 
recycling chlorine-free waste streams – did not pay off. 
In the mid-1980s, the release of organochlorines became a 
concern that could be addressed only through process 
changes. At that time, Scandinavian equipment suppliers 
had won a strong market position for these technologies. 
This was reinforced by the long period (more than a dec-
ade), required to bring a technology to commercialisation in 
this field, while US firms were required to rapidly address the 
problem of organochlorines. In addition, US producers of 
pulp were forced to make a second major investment. 
The development of in-process modifications to reduce or 
eliminate the release of organochlorines was promoted by 
NGOs. In particular, Greenpeace put pressure on publishing 
houses in Germany to use paper manufactured from TCF 
pulp. This had repercussions for their Scandinavian suppli-
ers of paper and pulp. Some early movers were able to cap-
ture higher prices for TCF paper. One impact was an in-
creased spread of information on environmental problems, 
as well as their solutions throughout the world. 
In the US, the threat of litigation from water sports organisa-
tions had an influence on the decision of manufacturers to 
adopt ECF pulping technologies. The further diffusion of 
chlorine-reduced technologies to newly industrialised coun-
tries, namely in Southeast Asia, was financially supported by 
aid agencies. An important role was also played by leading 
consulting firms, predominantly based in Scandinavia, who 
advocated the use of the most advanced technologies in the 
build-up of new production capacities in these countries. The 
few suppliers for these technologies act world-wide and are 
interested in selling the most advanced solutions. 
The case of ECF/TCF pulp production demonstrates the ad-
vantages of regulations which encourage a reduction of the 
entire waste stream, thus curbing the release of yet unrec-
ognised problem materials.  
The result of this case study is inconsistent with the hy-
pothesis that moving ahead with stricter regulation will in-
variably promote international competitiveness. Rather, it 
becomes obvious that the flexibility of the Scandinavian 
regulations was responsible for the good starting position of 
suppliers in these countries when the release of organochlo-
rines was recognised as a problem of pulp production.  
The importance of flexibility of environmental regulations has 
not been investigated in theoretical environmental econom-
ics models yet. 
4.5 Introduction of the catalytic converter for cars 
In the 1950s automobile exhaust emissions were identified 
as a main source of smog. This led to the adoption of air 
quality and auto emissions standards in California in 1959, 
imposing requirements for the reduction of HC by 80% and 
CO by 60% by 1966. Through this and later legislation, Cali-
fornia established itself as the pacesetter for US policy.  
At the federal level, the Clean Air Act was passed in 1970, 
calling for a reduction of 90% in HC and CO within five 
years, and in NOx within six years. These ambitious stan-
dards were set against the backdrop of a presidential cam-
paign which saw the candidates (Nixon and Muskie) compet-
ing in the field of environmental policy.  
This was the first time that Congress had set environmental 
targets, which were meant to be technology forcing, since 
the car manufactures claimed there was no existing emis-
sions control technology able to meet the new standards. 
The automobile industry, however, was not convinced that 
the standards would be enforced in the long term. Indeed, 
the EPA delayed their implementation until 1978, while in the 
1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress again re-
laxed standards for NOx.  
The automotive industry in the US might be characterised as 
an oligopoly, as it effectively avoids price as well as non-
price competition. In the 1970s, after the oil price shock, the 
sector came under heavy pressure by Japanese and Euro-
pean imports, especially in the small cars segment.  
The requirements for emissions control were a new chal-
lenge for this industry. There were different strategies avail-
able to meet these standards: (i) modifications of engines 
and control systems, as well as emission control devices and 
(ii) the investigation of alternative power trains for automo-
biles. US automakers co-operated in investigating technolo-
gies they considered likely to be successful. Co-operation in 
this area began as early as 1954. It continued until it was fi-
nally prohibited in 1969 as the result of a lawsuit brought by 
environmentalists arguing that the industry denied public ac-
cess to technological findings concerning emission controls.  
Another case of (international) co-operation, the Inter-
Industry Emissions Control Program (IIEC), was initiated at 
the beginning of the 1960s. This body included Ford, several 
oil companies, and import manufacturers such as VW and 
Toyota. GM and Chrysler did not participate because of the 
antitrust law.  
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R&D efforts regarding the catalytic converter began at the 
end of the 1950s at GM. At the same time, efforts were 
made in the development of alternative power train tech-
nologies, in particular electric, petrol, electric hybrids, as well 
as Stirling, steam power, fuel cell and gas turbine systems. 
In 1967 the Department of Commerce reviewed these alter-
native engines, concluding that they had not been ade-
quately studied and there was a need for further research.  
More strenuous efforts in research on the catalytic converter 
did not start until the end of the 1960s. GM established a 
task force in 1969 which was asked to evaluate the potential 
of catalytic converters for automobiles. This task force of 
high- anking individuals indicates that the problem of emis-
sions control had become a priority within the strategy of GM. 
The catalytic converter became the dominant technical strat-
egy to reduce emissions for two main reasons. Firstly, it did 
not affect basic engine design4, and secondly, it could be 
abandoned if there were a change in the law by Congress. 
The market for catalytic converters for mobile sources did 
not exist before the enactment of the US regulation. Catalytic 
converters for stationary sources were produced by a small 
number of companies, all of which were present on the 
American market at this time. Three firms in particular 
achieved success in developing and marketing catalytic con-
verters for mobile sources: the British-based company John-
son Matthey, and two American companies, Engelhard and 
Corning. Both of the US companies entered this field only af-
ter the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970. The suppliers 
who were active and successful on the US market at the be-
ginning of the 1970s are still the dominant producers world-
wide today. In 1998 Engelhard (US) controlled 30% of the 
world market, Johnson Matthey (UK) 25%, Degussa-Hüls 
(Germany) 17%, and  Delphi Automotive Systems (US) 15%. 
Along with NGK (Japan), Corning remains the major supplier 
of carrier materials for catalytic converters.  
The Japanese automotive industry focused early on the US 
emissions regulations. While Japanese automakers modified 
their export models as early as 1963 to meet the emissions 
standards set by New York and California, they did not com-
ply with their own government’s request in 1963 to build do-
mestic models with lower emissions. In 1971 the Japanese 
government adopted the emissions standards of the 1970 
Clean Air Act, setting a target date of 1975 for full compli-
ance. A policy supporting lead-free gasoline had been 
adopted in 1970, motivated equally by industrial policy 
(“benefit of trade”) on the one hand, and the need to address 
domestic environmental problems on the other.  
                                                 
4  Although the catalytic converter is usually considered an add-on 
device, it cannot function alone as such, but must be 
incorporated as a component in an overall emissions control 
system which requires lead-free gasoline, a change in the design 
of existing technology as for example electronic engine control 
technology, and engines with lowered compression ratios and 
upgraded valve seats. Therefore the catalytic converter 
technology is not a simple add-on technology instead there was 
a need for technological adaption and in this context occurred 
network effects.  
A range of technical solutions to meet these standards were 
developed, such as catalytic converters, improved combus-
tion control technology (lean burn combustion, the com-
pound vortex combustion chamber or CVCC, and stratified 
combustion), as well as the incineration of toxic emissions by 
thermal reactors. However, in order to meet the NOx stan-
dards and adapt to global markets, the Japanese govern-
ment chose the three-way catalytic converter as its preferred 
strategy in 1978.  
Even when the US relaxed its air quality standards against 
the background of the energy crisis and the difficulty of the 
automobile industry in complying with the legislation, Japan 
maintained a strict pro-environment policy, mainly because 
of successful lobbying and lawsuits brought by some cities in 
their fight against air pollution. A report on the technical fea-
sibility of catalytic converters supported the EPA’s decision 
to put the standards into force in 1978 with little delay. 
Compared to the US car market (big three), the automobile 
industry in Japan was much more competitive. 
With regard to regulatory style, there has been a much more 
co-operative structure between industry and government in 
Japan compared to the situation in the USA. The govern-
ment supported the introduction of tax incentives for low-
emissions cars.  
The European emissions standards were mainly driven by 
concerns about European harmonisation. Companies that 
exported to the US (such as Mercedes, Saab and Volvo) had 
to meet these standards and had incentives to promote their 
adoption in Europe. Sweden had adopted the American 
standards in 1976, with other countries following in 1985.  
The development of more stringent regulations in Europe 
was rooted in the German regulation limiting the lead-
content of petrol (1978) and in the debate on acid rain 
(Waldsterben) in 1983. This led to regulatory initiatives of the 
German government at the European level.  
However, the German manufacturers were divided. On one 
side were the exporting producers who had experience with 
catalytic converters, and on the other the manufacturers 
producing mainly for the European market. Ironically, it was 
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the subsidiaries of two American producers, Opel and Ford, 
who were least prepared to introduce the catalytic converter.  
The 1984 European Commission proposal for emissions 
standards did not stipulate any specific technology. The is-
sue divided the member states into two opposing groups. 
Countries without automobile industries, such as Denmark 
and the Netherlands, joined Germany, home both of major 
car exporters to the US and of Bosch, the main supplier of 
electronic automotive equipment. The opposing camp, which 
included France and the United Kingdom, focused its efforts 
mainly on the development of clean engines. French car 
manufacturers, especially, argued that there should not be a 
decision in support of the BAT – which at this time was the 
catalytic converter – but rather that time should be left to de-
velop alternative technologies.  
Finally, the European Community adopted a directive in 
June 1985 which imposed different emissions standards ac-
cording to engine type. As a result, unleaded petrol became 
available throughout the EU and high-powered cars had to 
be equipped with three-way catalytic converters. This stan-
dard was later tightened such that low-powered cars also 
had to be equipped with three-way catalytic converters from 
1993 onwards. According to some commentators, some 
German automakers were able to achieve a temporary com-
petitive advantage over the French car industry.  
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Driven by the environmental problems mainly in the cities of 
developing countries, the diffusion of the catalytic converter 
is still in progress, as, for example, in India or China. Interna-
tional institutions such as the World Bank, along with various 
organisations, are important supporters of the diffusion. 
5 Conclusions 
On the basis of the presented case studies, as well as sev-
eral studies that have not been presented due to limited 
space, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions 
regarding innovation processes and the international diffu-
sion of environmental technologies.  
Figure 10: Lead Markets for Environmental Technologies  
An environmental lead market is the core of the world market  
for a product or process and is characterised by the following: 
• National policy or non-governmental influences successfully create a structure of 
incentives for users to adopt an innovation relating to a (manifest or latent) inter-
national environmental problem.  
• The international dimension of the problem creates a potential demand in other 
geographic markets as well as the domestic market. 
• Environmental lead markets are frequently initiated by national policy innovations 
(e.g. standards) which potentially diffuse to other countries. Policy innova-
tion/diffusion and technical innovation/diffusion are closely interrelated.  
• The diffusion of environmental policy innovations is supported both by horizontal 
imitation (“benchmarking”, “lesson-drawing”) and by international organisations. 
• The international diffusion of environmental innovations can be facilitated by a 
range of mechanisms other than policy diffusion, including cost reductions, export 
orientation and innovation superiority. 
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We understand lead markets for environmental technologies 
as regional or national markets which – stimulated by de-
manding preferences for environmental goods in a given 
country, by specific supporting measures, or by policy inter-
ventions – influence markets in other regions, triggering ad-
justments that lead to an international diffusion of the new 
technologies. We take into account here that environmental 
innovations must be largely attributed  to governmental (or 
NGO) activities.  
There are demand-driven lead markets (i.e. nations with 
higher environmental standards), which lead to a widespread 
adoption of environmentally friendly technologies. Examples 
of this phenomenon include the California exhaust gas stan-
dards for automobiles and the Swedish regulations on the 
use of cadmium (Jacob 2002). Other lead markets are driven 
by a supply of innovative technologies. Frequently, the pro-
ducers of technologies seek to extend their markets and 
therefore lobby for international support for their technolo-
gies.  
Regarding the pioneering countries that have successfully 
established their innovations in world markets, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: The pioneer country demon-
strates the feasibility of its standards and regulations. Sub-
sequently, the innovative regulation is adopted by other 
countries. A diffusion of the regulations is more likely if a 
country has a reputation as a pioneer. A very small number 
of countries today, mostly member states of the EU, serve 
as the benchmark for the environmental policy development. 
Our cases confirm once again the leading role of the Scan-
dinavian countries in this respect. The frequent success of 
these countries in establishing lead markets underlines that 
great market size is not necessary. Even very small coun-
tries like Sweden may push the international market to adopt 
their standards. 
All of the countries identified as lead markets are highly inte-
grated in world markets and demonstrate good overall eco-
nomic performance. They are seen to have a high degree of 
technological competence, at least in the particular field of 
the innovation concerned.   
The pioneer market, with its demanding environmental regu-
lations can, however, also send out signals to the supply 
side beyond the domestic market. In such cases, competitive 
companies can advertise their ability to supply such de-
manding market areas as a sign of their technological com-
petence. If there are scale effects, it can be cost-efficient to 
orient production to the highest standards. 
With regard to the types of innovations that are likely to dif-
fuse internationally, the following is worth mentioning: The 
cases we have presented encompass process innovations 
as well as product innovations, and thus run counter to the 
view prevalent in the literature that only product innovations 
lend themselves to global diffusion (e.g. Scharpf 1999). All 
process technologies, however, can also be regarded as 
products. For the technologies and countries examined, pe-
culiarities of factor prices or complementary goods do not 
seem to be of great significance, which may enhance the 
transferability of these technologies. 
Lead markets depend on policies and regulations, and there-
fore government agencies are frequently important actors in 
the process of innovation and diffusion. However, in two 
cases (chlorine-reduced pulp production and CFC/HFC-free 
refrigeration) NGOs, above all Greenpeace, took over the 
role of policymaker to a large extent. For the three-litre car 
and the promotion of wind energy, environmental NGOs 
were at least important players. The significance of multina-
tional companies in the process of innovation is less clear, 
however. Several studies have stressed their importance for 
the diffusion of innovations. International organisations 
sometimes do play a role in diffusion, but are insignificant as 
to the innovation in the pioneer country. Learning and adop-
tion also takes place in the form of country-to-country learn-
ing. 
The underlying environmental problems are both local and 
global. Those that are local have parallels in other regions of 
the world. In most cases, the problems are on the interna-
tional agenda. Except for the case of the catalytic converter, 
the solutions adopted to the problems were not EOP solu-
tions, but rather integrated technologies. Therefore, the 
technologies do not simply impose additional costs, but have 
at least the potential for additional advantages.  
In most of the cases, subsidies were paid in the pioneering 
country, either directly – by reducing the costs of the innova-
tion or its complementary goods – or indirectly – by increas-
ing the benefit of an innovation. Energy taxes were important 
as a background variable in several cases. For the chemi-
cals (phosphates, CFCs and cadmium), early prohibitions in 
the respective pioneering countries were important driving 
forces. Explicit political strategies to support the diffusion of 
policies as a means of extending markets are rare. The de-
pendence of environmental innovations on political strate-
gies should not imply that there is a causal relationship in 
which regulators force the adoption of a specific technology. 
Instead, policies usually take up existing technologies and 
support their diffusion. Regulations were tightened when 
substitutes were successful. In general, the policy style is 
characterised by flexibility and an orientation to innovation. 
Frequently, the lead countries have the image of a pioneer in 
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environmental policy. Industry therefore might expect the dif-
fusion of the policy innovations. Indeed, all cases confirm a 
demonstration effect of the policy measures on other coun-
tries. The adopted policies are transferable to other countries 
without many modifications. In general, regulations stimulate 
diversity rather than demanding a specific technical solution.  
The economic risks for innovators and the risk reduction for 
adopters vary among the technologies, depending on the 
one hand on the necessary investments and on the other on 
possible subsidies that reduce the costs of adoption. Most of 
the case studies demonstrate that strict and early regulations 
hold the potential of advantages in exports, or at least that 
they bring no serious additional costs for pioneering.  
Network externalities were important only in two cases (bio-
mass CHP, where the availability of a district heating grid is 
an important factor for a high degree of market penetration, 
and catalytic converters, which require lead-free petrol). For 
other technologies (hydrogen- or electricity-powered cars), 
the lack of an appropriate infrastructure explains the failure 
of diffusion.  
Whether the analysis of lead markets can be applied fruitfully 
to innovations in the stage of development or introduction to 
the market is an open question. By identifying emerging lead 
markets for environmental innovations, the stimulating and 
supporting policies could be optimised and R&D efforts could 
be adjusted more precisely. Forthcoming studies by the au-
thors aim at analysing such emerging markets.  
The Emergence of Lead Markets for Environmental Innovations  23 
6 Literature 
Alliance for Environmental Technology (2001): Trends in World Bleached Chemical Pulp Production 1990-
2000. http://www.aet.org/science/aet_trends_2000.html (21.11.2002). 
Anderson, Jason (2000): Keeping Cool Without Warming the Planet: Cutting HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 in Eu-
rope. http://www.climnet.org/pubs/PIGGfinal.pdf (11.11.2002). 
Bätcher, Karen/Böhm, Eberhard/Tötsch, Walter (1992): Untersuchung über die Auswirkungen geplanter 
gesetzlicher Beschränkungen auf die Verwendung, Verbreitung und Substitution von Cadmium in Pro-
dukten. Karlsruhe (Fraunhofer-Institut für Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung). 
Beise, Marian (1999): Lead Markets and the International Allocation of R & D. Paper prepared for the 5. 
ASEAT Conference “Demand, Markets, Users and Innovation: Sociological and Economic Approa-
ches”, Sept. 14-16, Manchester 1999. 
Beise, Marian (2001): Lead Markets. Country Specific Success Factors of the Global Diffusion of Innovati-
ons. Heidelberg/New York: Physica Verlag. 
Blazejczak, Jürgen/Edler, Dietmar/Hemmelskamp, Jens/Jänicke, Martin (1999): Umweltpolitik und Innova-
tion: Politikmuster und Innovationswirkungen im internationalen Vergleich. In: Zeitschrift für Umweltpo-
litik und Umweltrecht, 22 (1), 1-32. 
Bommer, Rolf (1996): Das Drei-Liter-Auto: Ein sinnvoller Lösungsansatz? In: Wirtschaftsdienst, 5/1996, 
256-260. 
Conrad, Jobst (1998): Environmental Management in European Companies. Amsterdam: Gordon and 
Breach. 
Dekimpe, Marnik G./Parker, Philip M./Sarvary, Miklos (1998): “Globalisation”: Modelling Technology Adop-
tion Timing Across Countries. INSEAD working paper No. 98/69/MKT. 
DEWI (Deutsche Windenergie-Institut GmbH) (2000): Magazin Nr. 17, August 2000.  
Dosi, Giovanni/Pavitt, Keith/Soete, Luc (1990): The Economics of Technical Change and International 
Trade. New York et al.: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Ecchia, Giulio/Mariotti, Mario (1994): A Survey on Environmental Policy: Technological Innovation and 
Strategic Issues. FEEM Nota die Lavoro 44.94. 
Fees, Eberhard/Mühlheusser, Gerd (1999): Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the 
Learning Curve. In: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Bd. 50. Göttingen, 178-194.  
Fees, Eberhard/Taistra, Gregor (2001): Strategische Umweltpolitik - Überblick und weiterer Forschungs-
bedarf. In: Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht, 1/2001, 1-19. 
Franke, Angela (1998): Auf dem Weg zum 3-Liter-Auto - Minderung der verkehrsbedingten CO2-
Emissionen. In: Ifo Institut: Abschätzung der innovativen Wirkungen umweltpolitischer Instrumente - 
dargestellt am Beispiel des Systems Straßenverkehr. München, 146 – 179. 
Grundmann, Rainer (1999): Transnationale Umweltpolitik zum Schutz der Ozonschicht. USA und 
Deutschland im Vergleich. Frankfurt/M./New York: Campus-Verlag.  
Haas, Reinhard (Ed.) (2000): Review Report on Promotion Strategies For Electricity From Renewable E-
nergy Sources In EU Countries.  http://www.itpower.co.uk/services/ELGREEN_report.pdf 
(19.12.2002). 
Héritier, Adrienne/Mingers, Susanne/Knill, Christoph/Becka, Martin (1994): Die Veränderung von Staat-
lichkeit in Europa - Ein regulativer Wettbewerb: Deutschland, Großbritannien, Frankreich. Opladen: 
Leske+Budrich. 
IEA/OECD (2002): Energy Balances of OECD Countries 1960 - 2000. International Energy Agency Sta-
tistics, OECD Paris 
Jacob, Klaus (1999): Innovationsorientierte Chemikalienpolitik. Politische, soziale und ökonomische Fak-
toren des verminderten Gebrauchs gefährlicher Stoffe. München: Herbert Utz Verlag. 
Jänicke, Martin (1998): Umweltpolitik: Global am Ende oder am Ende global? In: Beck, Ulrich (Ed.) (1998): 
Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 332-344. 
Jänicke, Martin (2000): Ecological Modernisation. Berlin (Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik/Freie Univer-
sität Berlin, FFU-Report 00-8). 
 
24 Beise • Blazejczak • Edler • Jacob • Jänicke • Loew • Petschow • Rennings 
Jänicke, Martin/Blazejczak, Jürgen/Edler, Dietmar/Hemmelskamp, Jens (2000): Environmental Policy and 
Innovation: an International Comparison of Policy Frameworks and Innovation Effects. In: Hem-
melskamp, Jens/Rennings, Klaus/Leone, Fabio (Eds.) (2000): Innovation-oriented Environmental Re-
gulation. Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Analysis. Heidelberg/New York: Physica-Verlag, 125-
152. 
Jänicke, Martin/Weidner, Helmut (Eds.) (in coll. with Jörgens, Helge) (1997): National Environmental Poli-
cies: A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building. Berlin et al.: Springer. 
Jörgens, Helge (1996): Die Institutionalisierung von Umweltpolitik im internationalen Vergleich. In: Jäni-
cke, Martin (Ed.) (1996): Umweltpolitik der Industrieländer. Entwicklung - Bilanz - Erfolgsbedingungen. 
Berlin: Edition Sigma, 59-111. 
Kalish, Shlomo/Mahajan, Vijay/Muller, Eitan (1995): Waterfall and Sprinkler New-Product Strategies in 
Competitive Global Markets. In: International Journal of Research in Marketing, 12 (2), 105-119. 
Kern, Kristine (2000): Die Diffusion von Umweltinnovationen. Umweltpolitische Innovationen im Mehrebe-
nensystem der USA. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. 
Kern, Kristine/Jörgens, Helge/Jänicke, Martin (1999): Die Diffusion umweltpolitischer Innovationen. Ein 
Beitrag zur Globalisierung von Umweltpolitik. Berlin (Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik/Freie Universi-
tät Berlin, FFU-Report 99-11). 
Klemmer, Paul/Lehr, Ulrike/Löbbe, Klaus (1999): Umweltinnovationen. Anreize und Hemmnisse. Berlin: 
Analytica. 
Langraf, Béatrice/Kellner,Thiemo (2000): Windenergie in Europa: Was bringen Gesetzgebung und För-
dermaßnahmen. Interwind AG Zürich. http://www.interwind.ch/bfest_de.htm#A.3 (21.11.2002). 
Lehmann, Harry/Reetz, Torsten (1995): Zukunftsenergien. Strategien einer neuen Energiepolitik. Birkhäu-
ser, Berlin. 
Levitt, Theodore (1983): The Globalisation of Markets. In: Harvard Business Review, 61 (3), 92-102. 
Little, Arthur (2002): Global Comparative Analysis of HFC and Alternative Technologies for Refrigeration, 
Air Conditioning, Foam, Solvent, Aerosol Propellant, and Fire Protection Applications. Final Report to 
the Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy. http://www.arap.org/adlittle/HFCstudy3-22JD.pdf 
(11.11.2002) 
Lohbeck, Wolfgang (1999): The Greenfreeze Wave Keeps on Rolling. In: Development and Trends in 
ODS Phase Out. Yearbook 1997-1999. Edited by GTZ Project PROKLIMA, http://www.gtz.de/proklima 
(11.11.2002) 
Lorentzen, Gustav (1995): The Use of Natural Refrigerants. A Complete Solution to the CFC/HCFC-
Predicament. In: GTZ Yearbook 1995. http://www.gtz.de/proklima (11.11.2002). 
Mansfield, Edwin (1968): Industrial Research and Technological Innovation: An Econometric Analysis. 
New York: Norton. 
Maté, John (n.d.):. A Non-Governmental Organization’s Campaign to Save the Ozone Layer. Case Study 
of the Greenpeace Ozone Campaign. http://a1216.g.akamai.net/7/1216/1532/cf99977c7ebe16/archive 
.greenpeace.org/~climate/climatecountdown/documents/makingadiff.pdf (11.11.2002) 
Meyer-Krahmer, Frieder (1999): Was bedeutet Globalisierung für Aufgaben und Handlungsspielräume na-
tionaler Innovationspolitiken?- In: Grimmer, Klaus /Kuhlmann,Stefan /Meyer-Krahmer, Frieder (Hrsg.): 
Innovationspolitik in globalisierten Arenen. Opladen: Leske und Budrich: 43-74. 
Oberthür, Sebastian (1997): Umweltschutz durch internationale Regime. Interessen, Verhandlungspro-
zesse, Wirkungen. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. 
OECD (1994): Capacity Development in Environment. Paris. 
Petersen, Rudolf/Diaz-Bone, Harald (1998): Das Drei-Liter-Auto. Berlin: Birkhäuser Verlag. 
Porter, Michael, (1990): The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press. 
Porter, Michael/van der Linde, Claas (1995): Towards a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship, In: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (4), 97-118. 
Posner, Michael V. (1961): International Trade and Technical Change. In: Oxford Economic Papers, 13 
(3), 323-341. 
Rose, Richard (1993): Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy. A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space. 
Chatham: Chatham House. 
The Emergence of Lead Markets for Environmental Innovations  25 
Rugman, Alan M./Verbeke, A. (1998): Corporate Strategy and International Environmental Policy. In: 
Journal of International Business Studies, 29 (4), 819-833. 
Sakakibara, Mariko/Porter, Michael, (2001): Competing at Home to Win Abroad: Evidence From Japanese 
Industry. In: Review of Economics and Statistics, 83 (2), 310-322. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1999): Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford/New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Scholz, Christian M./Stähler, Frank (1999): Unilateral Environmental Policy and International Competitive-
ness (Kieler Studien 299). Tübingen: JCB Mohr. 
Siscars, Stephan (1999): The ECOFRIG Project Support of Hydrocarbon Technology Developments in In-
dia. In: Development and Trends in ODS Phase Out. Yearbook 1997-1999. Edited by GTZ Project 
PROKLIMA, http://www.gtz.de/proklima (11/11/02).  
Sicars, Stephan (1995): Natural Fluid Based Refrigeration. In: gtz Yearbook 1995. 
http://www.gtz.de/proklima (11/11/02). 
Spanos, Yiannis E./Lioukas, Spyros (2001): An Examination Into the Causal Logic of Rent Generation: 
Contrasting Porter’s Competitive Strategy Framework and the Resource Based Perspective. In: Stra-
tegic Management Journal, 22 (10), 907-934. 
Taistra, Gregor (2000): Die Porter-Hypothese zur Umweltpolitik. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-
Verlag. 
Takada, Hirokazu/Jain, Dipak (1991): Cross-National Analysis of Diffusion of Consumer Durable Goods in 
Pacific Rim Countries. In: Journal of Marketing, 55 (April), 48-54. 
Ulph, Alistair M. (1996): Strategic Environmental Policy and International Competitiveness. In: Siebert, 
Horst (Ed.) (1996): Elemente einer rationalen Umweltpolitik: Expertisen zur umweltpolitischen Neuori-
entierung. Tübingen: JCB Mohr, 337-376. 
Ulph, Alistair M./Ulph, David (1996): Trade, Strategic Innovation and Strategic Environmental Policy - A 
General Analysis. In: Carraro, Carlo (Ed.) et al. (1996): Environmental Policy and Market Structure. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 181-208. 
Underdal, Arild (2001): Speech, given on the Berlin Conference on the Human Dimension of Global 
Change: Global Environmental Change and the Nationstate. 7-8 December 2001.  
UNEP (1998): 1998 Report of the Refrigeration, Air Conditioning and Heat Pumps Technical Options 
Committee. http://TEAP:PUBLIC@teap.org/RTOC1998.pdf (11/11/02) 
Vernon, Raymond (1966): International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle. In: Quar-
terly Review of Economics, 88 (May), 190-207. 
Vernon, Raymond (1979): The Product Cycle Hypothesis in a New International Environment. In: Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 41 (4), 255-267.  
Weidner, Helmut/Jänicke, Martin (Eds.) (2001): National Environmental Policies II. Forthcoming. 
White, Lawrence J.(1980): Automobile Emission Control Policy: Success Story or Wrongheaded Regulati-
on? In: Ginsburg, Douglas H./Abernathy, William J. (Eds.) (1982): Governemnt Technology and the 
Future of the Automobile. New York et al.: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 401 - 420. 
World Bank /GTZ /Swiss Agency for Development and Cupertino SDC (1996): Assessment of the 
Prospects for Hydrocarbon Technology in the global Domestic Refrigeration Market. September 1996. 
http://www.hychill.com/pdf/worldbnk.pdf (21.11.2002). 
 
